Marco Giometti
Marco Giometti
Ciao! Welcome to my website.
I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. I hold a PhD in Finance from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.
My research uses loan-level and administrative data to examine how banks collect and use information, how this shapes credit allocation and financial contracting, and how firms’ financing responds to technological, regulatory, and macroeconomic changes.
You can download my CV here.
Contact: marco.giometti@uc3m.es | margiometti@gmail.com
Links: Google Scholar | LinkedIn | UC3M | ORCID | ResearchGate
Working Papers
Digitalization and Credit Markets: Evidence from eInvoicing Draft BdE WP CEPR DP SSRN
Banco de España Working Paper No. 2619; CEPR Discussion Paper No. 21728
Conditionally Accepted, Review of Finance.
We document the effects of electronic invoicing (eInvoicing) on credit markets. By making invoices more standardized, verifiable, and harder to falsify, eInvoicing changes lenders’ information sets, facilitating invoice-based financing and credit risk assessment. We exploit a regional eInvoicing mandate and administrative credit data using a difference-in-differences design to provide three main insights. First, credit reallocates toward firms already relying on invoice-based credit (“invoice firms”) and away from non-invoice firms. Second, the cost of (non-)invoice credit falls (rises) for (non-)invoice firms, consistent with a supply-driven mechanism. Third, banks’ information production changes: eInvoicing widens (reduces) the dispersion of rates and banks’ risk assessments and improves (worsens) their predictive accuracy for (non-)invoice firms. Overall, eInvoicing reshapes credit market outcomes, with uneven effects across borrowers.
Bank Specialization, Control Rights, and Real Effects Draft SSRN Older FDIC CFR WP
Previously circulated as “Bank Specialization and the Design of Loan Contracts.”
Revise & Resubmit, Management Science.
We study how lenders’ industry expertise affects loan covenant design and enforcement. Using a large sample of U.S. corporate loans, we find that industry-specialized lenders impose less restrictive financial covenants and exhibit greater dispersion in contract terms. Following a covenant violation, borrowers financed by specialized banks experience smaller drops in investment without a decline in performance. Our results suggest that lenders improve contracting efficiency by leveraging industry-level knowledge, which is transferable across borrowers.
Relationship Lending when Borrowers Are in Distress Draft
In this paper I investigate whether relationship lending helps borrowers experiencing idiosyncratic financial distress. By constructing a novel dataset on syndicated lending that tracks the availability and pricing of credit for US corporate borrowers over three decades, I conclude that relationship lending benefits borrowers in distress. In particular, I explicitly distinguish loan renegotiations from new originations, and account for the state-contingent provisions on loan pricing often present in credit agreements. I compare loan terms granted to borrowers in distress by relationship and non-relationship lenders. By employing a within-firm approach to alleviate possible selection issues, I find that relationship lenders provide a higher credit amount, charge lower interest rates, and require similar collateral and fees. I show that firms benefit from relationship lending irrespective of their access to outside financing options. Overall, I provide support to theories of implicit commitment and reputational capital in lending relationships.
Work in Progress
Energy Prices, Credit Risk, and Bank Lending Dynamics
How do energy-price shocks transmit through credit markets? Using Spanish credit-register and loan-application data around the 2022 European energy crisis, we study how higher energy costs affect borrower repayment, bank-recognized credit risk, and credit allocation. Energy-intensive firms become more likely to miss loan payments, and lenders classify more credit to these firms as non-performing, increase provisions, and assign higher probabilities of default. Banks more exposed to this deterioration reallocate credit toward incumbents, particularly energy-intensive firms, and away from prospective borrowers by reducing new relationship formation. Real shocks can thus propagate through banks by changing who gets credit, not only how much.:::
Selected Invited Discussions
Geopolitical Risk and Lending: Evidence from U.S. Technology Export Controls and the Market for Syndicated Loans by Fabiana Gomez, Doni Prasetyo, Klaus Schaeck, 2026 International Workshop on Financial System Architecture & Stability
Endogenous Bank Risk Heterogeneity and the Anatomy of Systemic Fragility by Jorge Abad, David Martinez-Miera, Javier Suarez, 33rd Finance Forum of the Spanish Finance Association
Platform Credit, Advertising, and Customer Capital by Matthias Efing, Yi Huang, Ruobing Han, Qi Sun, Daniel Yi Xu, EUROFIDAI-ESSEC Paris December 2025 Finance Meeting
How Do Lenders Manage Collateral Illiquidity? by Francisco Amaral and Gianmarco Ruzzier, 10th MadBar Workshop on Banking and Corporate Finance
Poison Bonds by Rex Wang Renjie and Shuo Xia, Third Aarhus Workshop on Strategic Interaction in Corporate Finance
Bank Specialization in Lending to New Firms by Diana Bonfim, Ralph De Haas, Alexandra Matyunina, Steven Ongena, 32nd Finance Forum of the Spanish Finance Association
The expert’s edge? Bank lending specialization and informational advantages for credit risk assessment by Mathieu Simoens and Fabio Tamburrini, 9th EFiC Conference in Banking and Corporate Finance
Court shopping, pro-debtor bias, and bankruptcy outcomes by Kris Boudt, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Rafael Matta, Shilin Zhang, 18th Belgian Financial Research Forum
Concentrating on Bailouts: Government Guarantees and Bank Asset Composition by Christian Eufinger, Juan Pablo Gorostiaga, and Björn Richter, 8th MadBar Workshop on Banking and Corporate Finance
Bank Competition and Bargaining over Refinancing by Marina Emiris, Francois Koulischer, and Christophe Spaenjers, Finance and Accounting 2023 Annual Research Symposium
Other Work
Persistence of Innovation and Knowledge Flows in Africa: An Empirical Investigation
Innovation and Development. 2016. 6(2), 235-257. [Link]