Marco Giometti
Marco Giometti
Ciao! Welcome to my website.
I am an Assistant Professor of Finance in the Business Department at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
I received my PhD in Finance from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in May 2022.
My research focuses on Banking, Credit Markets, and Financial Contracting.
You can download my CV here.
Contact: marco.giometti@uc3m.es | margiometti@gmail.com
Links: Google Scholar | LinkedIn | UC3M | ORCID | ResearchGate
Working Papers
Digitalization and Credit Markets: Evidence from eInvoicing
Revise & Resubmit, Review of Finance.
We document the effects of electronic invoicing (eInvoicing) on credit markets. By making invoices more standardized, verifiable, and harder to falsify, eInvoicing changes lenders’ information sets, facilitating invoice-based financing and credit risk assessment. We exploit a regional eInvoicing mandate and administrative credit data using a difference-in-differences design to provide three main insights. First, credit reallocates toward firms already relying on invoice-based credit (“invoice firms”) and away from non-invoice firms. Second, the cost of (non-)invoice credit falls (rises) for (non-)invoice firms, consistent with a supply-driven mechanism. Third, banks’ information production changes: eInvoicing widens (reduces) the dispersion of rates and banks’ risk assessments and improves (worsens) their predictive accuracy for (non-)invoice firms. Overall, eInvoicing reshapes credit market outcomes, with uneven effects across borrowers.
Bank Specialization, Control Rights, and Real Effects [SSRN]
Revise & Resubmit, Management Science.
[formerly circulated as “Bank Specialization and the Design of Loan Contracts”, FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2022-14]
We study how lenders’ industry expertise affects loan covenant design and enforcement. Using a large sample of U.S. corporate loans, we find that industry-specialized lenders impose less restrictive financial covenants and exhibit greater dispersion in contract terms. Following a covenant violation, borrowers financed by specialized banks experience smaller drops in investment without a decline in performance. Our results suggest that lenders improve contracting efficiency by leveraging industry-level knowledge, which is transferable across borrowers.
Relationship Lending when Borrowers Are in Distress
In this paper I investigate whether relationship lending helps borrowers experiencing idiosyncratic financial distress. By constructing a novel dataset on syndicated lending that tracks the availability and pricing of credit for US corporate borrowers over three decades, I conclude that relationship lending benefits borrowers in distress. In particular, I explicitly distinguish loan renegotiations from new originations, and account for the state-contingent provisions on loan pricing often present in credit agreements. I compare loan terms granted to borrowers in distress by relationship and non-relationship lenders. By employing a within-firm approach to alleviate possible selection issues, I find that relationship lenders provide a higher credit amount, charge lower interest rates, and require similar collateral and fees. I show that firms benefit from relationship lending irrespective of their access to outside financing options. Overall, I provide support to theories of implicit commitment and reputational capital in lending relationships.
Work in Progress
Energy Prices, Credit Risk, and Bank Lending Dynamics
How do energy-price shocks affect credit markets? Using Spanish credit register and loan application data around the 2022 European energy crisis, we show that loans to energy-intensive firms become more likely to enter payment delay. Banks also classify a larger share of credit to these firms as non-performing, set aside higher loan-loss provisions, and assign them higher probabilities of default. Banks more exposed to these borrowers reallocate credit across relationships. They preserve credit to incumbent borrowers in energy-intensive sectors while reducing approvals and loan amounts for new borrowers. Energy shocks propagate through the banking sector by changing who gets credit, not only how much credit is supplied.
Selected Invited Discussions
Platform Credit, Advertising, and Customer Capital by Matthias Efing, Yi Huang, Ruobing Han, Qi Sun, Daniel Yi Xu, EUROFIDAI-ESSEC Paris December 2025 Finance Meeting
How Do Lenders Manage Collateral Illiquidity? by Francisco Amaral and Gianmarco Ruzzier, 10th MadBar Workshop on Banking and Corporate Finance
Poison Bonds by Rex Wang Renjie and Shuo Xia, Third Aarhus Workshop on Strategic Interaction in Corporate Finance
Bank Specialization in Lending to New Firms by Diana Bonfim, Ralph De Haas, Alexandra Matyunina, Steven Ongena, 32nd Finance Forum of the Spanish Finance Association
The expert’s edge? Bank lending specialization and informational advantages for credit risk assessment by Mathieu Simoens and Fabio Tamburrini, 9th EFiC Conference in Banking and Corporate Finance
Court shopping, pro-debtor bias, and bankruptcy outcomes by Kris Boudt, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Rafael Matta, Shilin Zhang, 18th Belgian Financial Research Forum
Concentrating on Bailouts: Government Guarantees and Bank Asset Composition by Christian Eufinger, Juan Pablo Gorostiaga, and Björn Richter, 8th MadBar Workshop on Banking and Corporate Finance
Bank Competition and Bargaining over Refinancing by Marina Emiris, Francois Koulischer, and Christophe Spaenjers, Finance and Accounting 2023 Annual Research Symposium
Other Work
Persistence of Innovation and Knowledge Flows in Africa: An Empirical Investigation
Innovation and Development. 2016. 6(2), 235-257. [Link]